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Making a Nuisance of Takings Law
Robert L. Glicksman*
It has become commonplace, if not hackneyed, to portray the law
of regulatory takings as a hopelessly confused welter of conflicting
precedents.1 Despite his persistent efforts to shed light on the doctrine
in this area, in 1984 Dan Mandelker and the other authors of the
famous White River Junction Manifesto asserted that “[t]here has
never been a readily ascertainable way to tell when a regulation is or
will be a ‘taking,’ and none is in prospect.”2 To the extent that this
unfortunate characterization remains accurate today, it is appropriate
to absolve Professor Mandelker entirely of the blame. Indeed, the
situation would undoubtedly be even worse if not for Dan
Mandelker’s labors. A considerable portion of his voluminous body
of scholarship has been devoted to dispelling the miasma that
surrounds takings law. Among other things, Professor Mandelker has
postulated a regulatory risk theory to explain when landowners
* Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas. The author thanks Dan
Tarlock and Richard E. Levy for helpful comments during the preparation of this essay and
Catherine Skelton, J.D., University of Kansas School of Law, for research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1118 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (bemoaning “the confused nature of some of
our takings case law”); Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640
So.2d 54, 57 (Fla. 1994) (noting the “apparent incoherence of taking[s] law”) (quoting
Department of Transp. v. Weisenfeld, 617 So.2d 1071, 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Griffin,
J., concurring)); City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 641 So.2d 1377, 1384
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that “‘takings’ law is one of the most confused areas in
American jurisprudence”); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 935 P.2d 555, 578 (Wash. 1997) (“The
formerly well-established jurisprudence of eminent domain has been pushed into the
background by claims of inverse condemnation, regulatory taking, and substantive due process,
creating an utterly confusing mish mash.”). See also Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed:
Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings,
102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078 (1993) (stating that the takings clause has become “engulfed in
confusion”).
2. Norman Williams et al., The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193, 225
(1984). See also Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB.
LAW. 215, 249 (1995) [hereinafter Investment-Backed Expectations] (“No problem is more
intractable in land-use law than defining the boundaries of regulation protected from attack
under the Taking Clause.”).
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should be entitled to claim that regulatory interference with
investment-backed expectations gives rise to a taking.3 Further,
Professor Mandelker has tackled the “conceptual muddle” of the
segmentation principle that is meant to define the property interest
subject to regulation,4 considered the appropriate level of scrutiny
courts should apply in resolving takings challenges,5 and challenged
the propriety of an inverse condemnation remedy.6
In addition to describing the present state of the law of regulatory
takings, Professor Mandelker has pulled no punches in providing
normative prescriptions for the future state of the law. In an article
published in response to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
the 1992 Lucas case,7 he savaged the Court for “repeal[ing] a century
of land use law.”8 As part I below explains, for years the Court took
the position that regulation of land use activity that amounted to a
nuisance could not result in a taking because the owner of the land
lacked the authority to engage in nuisance-like conduct. Lucas denied
that a per se rule shielding regulation of a nuisance-like use from
taking liability ever existed. However, the Court then created an
exception to a different per se rule (one that deems any regulation
resulting in a complete destruction of the economically viable use of
a regulated parcel to be a taking) for regulations that replicate
limitations on land use that inhere in background principles of state
common law. According to Mandelker, the Lucas decision promised
to “cripple legislative oversight” of potentially excessive land use
regulation by shifting from the legislature to the courts the authority
3. Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 2, passim; Daniel R. Mandelker,
Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There A Taking?, 31 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1987).
4. Daniel R. Mandelker, New Property Rights Under the Taking Clause, 81 MARQ. L.
REV. 9, 10 (1997).
5. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Two Cheers for Shifting the Presumption of
Validity: A Reply to Professor Hopperton, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 103 (1996); Daniel R.
Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law,
24 URB. LAW. 1 (1992); Daniel R. Mandelker, Reversing the Presumption of Constitutionality
in Land Use Litigation: Is Legislative Action Necessary?, 30 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5 (1986).
6. Williams et al., supra note 2, passim; Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The
Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981).
7. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
8. Daniel R. Mandelker, Of Mice and Missiles: A True Account of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 285, 301 (1993) [hereinafter Of Mice
and Missiles].
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to determine whether the purpose of regulation is legitimate.9 He
predicted that the “radical break with tradition in taking law”
reflected in Lucas would prompt commentators to assess “how far the
nuisance exception extends”10 and that, by “improperly enhanc[ing]
the protection of property rights under the taking clause,” it would
leave considerable destruction in its wake.11
The purpose of this essay is two-fold. First, by assessing how
lower federal courts and state courts have interpreted and applied the
nuisance exception to takings liability staked out in Lucas, it bears
out Professor Mandelker’s 1993 prognostication12 that commentators
would subsequently explore the parameters of that exception. As this
piece makes abundantly clear, Mandelker hardly needed me to write
an essay such as this one to validate him as a prescient evaluator of
the future course of regulatory takings law.
Second, by analyzing the post-Lucas decisions,13 it assesses
whether Lucas’s treatment of the nuisance exception has turned out to
be the radical and destructive break with tradition that Mandelker
feared. The short answer is that it has not, largely because courts have
accepted his attacks on the case as valid. After briefly describing the
historical role of the harm-benefit distinction in regulatory takings
jurisprudence, I devote the rest of part I to a description of Lucas and
Dan Mandelker’s critical response to it. Mandelker seemed
concerned, among other things, that the nuisance exception to the
9. Id.
10. Id. at 292.
11. Id. at 306.
12. Professor Mandelker has not been alone in his efforts to read the tea leaves of Lucas.
Richard Lazarus predicted within a year of the Lucas decision, correctly, as it now appears, that
“the majority’s intimations that the background principles [that form the basis for the exception
to the Lucas per se taking rule] must be supplied by judge-made common law, rather than by
legislative or regulatory enactment, will probably not survive review in the future.” Richard J.
Lazarus, Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1426 (1993). See infra
Part II.B.
13. Professor Mandelker engaged in a similar task when he surveyed post-1987 lower
federal court and state court decisions applying the investment-backed expectations factor that
is part of the ad hoc balancing approach to takings law enunciated in Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 2.
Mandelker selected 1987 as his benchmark because it was the year in which the Supreme Court
decided three important takings cases. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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categorical rule announced in Lucas amounted to an unwarranted
shift of authority from the legislatures to the courts as agents for
accommodating conflicting land uses. Part II begins by addressing
whether it makes sense to limit the nuisance exception to judicially
created limitations on title, and then surveys post-Lucas federal and
state court applications of the nuisance exception. The survey reveals
that, for the most part, courts are as uneasy about the shift in the
allocation of land use conflict resolution authority as Professor
Mandelker.
Part III focuses on a recent decision by the Supreme Court of
Iowa14 holding that a statute immunizing agricultural activities from
tort liability amounted to a taking of an easement across neighboring
property owners’ land. The decision does more than effectuate a
policy objective endorsed by Mandelker and his White River Junction
Manifesto cohorts— strengthening the role of the neighbors in the
resolution of land use conflicts. It is also fully consistent with
Mandelker’s criticism of the Lucas nuisance exception as
insufficiently solicitous of legislative prerogatives in resolving the
same kinds of conflicts. Finally, part IV concludes by assessing the
role of Mandelker himself in takings jurisprudence.
I. THE DERIVATIONS OF THE LUCAS NUISANCE EXCEPTION
A. Pre-Lucas Development of the Harm-Benefit Distinction
The notion that regulations restricting uses of property that
generate harm to other property or to the public interest do not trigger
an obligation to compensate the regulated property owner regardless
of the economic impact of the regulation on the property has deep
roots in the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence. In 1887 the Court
declared that “[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for
purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense,
be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
14. Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998), cert. denied sub
nom. Girres v. Bormann, 119 S. Ct. 1096 (1999).
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benefit.”15 The Court subsequently upheld the constitutionality of use
classification zoning ordinances that segregated low density uses
(such as single family or two-family residential uses) from higher
density uses (including industrial and commercial uses and even
apartment houses) by analogizing the placement of higher density
uses in close proximity to the low density uses to a nuisance.16
Eventually, some commentators derived from these cases a
distinction that became known as the harm-benefit test: a regulation
designed to extract benefits for the public from regulated property
owners required compensation. Alternatively, a regulation designed
to prevent a regulated property owner from imposing harm on
adjacent land or the public did not require compensation.17
The harm-benefit test generated considerable criticism, much of it
along the lines that there was no value-free way to distinguish
between a harm-prevention and a benefit-extraction measure.18 For
example, when the government enacts a regulatory scheme that
restricts development in an ecologically vulnerable area such as
wetlands or coastal zones, it is possible to view the scheme as one
15. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) (emphasis added). See also Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). Hadacheck is discussed infra part III.B.
16. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926) (“[i]n solving
doubts, the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which lies at the foundation of so much
of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew. And the law of
nuisances, likewise, may be consulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid
of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of, the [police] power.”).
17. “The idea is that compensation is required when the public helps itself to good at
private expense, but not when the public simply requires one of its members to stop making a
nuisance of himself.” Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1196 (1967). See
also ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 511 (1904) (explaining that when the government
properly exercises the police power, as opposed to the power of eminent domain, property
rights are impaired “not because they become useful or necessary to the public . . . but because
their free exercise is believed to be detrimental to public interests; . . . the state takes property
by eminent domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police power because it is
harmful”). Cf. Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971) (arguing that the government should not be required to compensate when it acts to
control spillover effects).
18. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 17, at 1197 (arguing that the test will not work
“unless we can establish a benchmark of ‘neutral’ conduct which enables us to say where
refusal to confer benefits (not reversible without just compensation) slips over into readiness to
inflict harms (reversible without compensation)”). See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in Takings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 433 (1995).
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that extracts benefits for the public in preserving the vulnerable
resource or as one that prevents the imposition of harm in destroying
a resource through development.19 Moreover, in 1978 the Supreme
Court threw into question the status of the harm-benefit test as a
determinant of takings liability when it issued its decision in the Penn
Central case.20 The Court enunciated a series of factors deemed to
have “particular significance”21 in takings cases: the economic impact
of the regulation on the property owner, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with “distinct investment-backed
expectations,” and “the character of the governmental action.”22
Under this ad hoc balancing test, it would be relatively difficult to
prove a taking as a result of an interference with property rights that
“arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good.”23 The Court
acknowledged that it had upheld land use regulations that either
destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property interests as
long as the governmental entity adopting them had reasonably
concluded that the health, safety, morals, or general welfare would be
promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land.24 The
owner of the regulated historic landmark sought to distinguish these
and similar cases on the ground that each involved prohibition of a
“noxious” use, whereas construction of a renovated railroad terminal
“would be beneficial.”25 The Court dismissed the distinction,
however, asserting that the cases in question were “better understood
as resting not on any supposed ‘noxious’ quality of the prohibited
uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably
related to the implementation of a policy— not unlike historic
19. Compare Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (holding that
ordinance restricting wetlands development was not a taking because it sought to control harm)
with State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) (reaching the opposite result). Professor Sax
regards Lucas as a “long-delayed” repudiation of Just. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and
the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1433, 1438 (1993) [hereinafter Economy of Nature].
20. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
21. Id. at 124.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 125. Among other cases, the Court cited Mugler, Hadacheck, and Euclid. Id. at
125-26.
25. 438 U.S. 104, at 133-34 n.30.
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preservation— expected to produce a widespread public benefit and
applicable to all similarly situated property.”26 Thus, regulations
directed at harm-producing activities are not entitled to uniquely
protected status when attacked as compensable takings. Regulations
that seek to benefit the public are subject to the same analysis as
measures directed at activities that generate harm, if the regulations
are applied in a non-discriminatory manner and are otherwise within
the scope of the police power.
Penn Central seemed to sound the death knell to the principle that
the analytical framework for assessing a takings claim turns largely
on whether a regulation is directed at a harm-producing activity.
However, the Court appeared to resuscitate the relevance of the
distinction between harm-producing and benefit-extracting measures
less than a decade later. In a case that presented a virtual replay of the
factual situation in the Court’s landmark decision in Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon,27 the Court in the Keystone case28 explained its
“hesitance” to find a taking “when the State merely restrains uses of
property that are tantamount to public nuisances.”29 This kind of
regulatory action was entitled to “special status” because “no
individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or
otherwise harm others.”30 Accordingly, “the State has not ‘taken’
anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like
activity.”31 Even if characterizing a regulated activity as nuisance-like
does not in all cases preclude the possibility of a taking, “the public
interest in preventing activities similar to public nuisances is a
substantial one, which in many instances has not required
compensation.”32 The Court’s references to activities that “otherwise”
26. Id. The Court added that the destruction of a historic landmark could fairly be
described as a harm-producing activity in any event. Id.
27. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Court held in Pennsylvania Coal that a statute that made it
commercially impractical to mine coal without causing subsidence of the surface in a manner
prohibited by the statute was a taking.
28. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
29. Id. at 491.
30. Id. at 491 n.20.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 492. For further discussion of the impact of Keystone on the nuisance-like use
exception, see Michael J. Davis & Robert L. Glicksman, To the Promised Land: A Century of
Wandering and A Final Homeland for the Due Process and Takings Clauses, 68 OR. L. REV.
393, 433-35 (1989).
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caused harm and to “activities similar to public nuisances” seemed to
indicate that the government could demand a halt to a harm-
producing activity without subjecting itself to an obligation to
compensate the affected property owner, even if the activity did not
amount to a common law nuisance.
Justice, subsequently Chief Justice, Rehnquist dissented in both
Penn Central and Keystone. In Penn Central, he acknowledged that
nearly a century of precedent supported the existence of what he
called the “nuisance exception,” but that the exception had been
interpreted narrowly.33 He claimed that its scope was not coterminous
with that of the police power; rather, the exception could shield
government action from the obligation to compensate only if the
targeted activity is “dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of
others.”34 In Keystone, he again confirmed that the Court had
“recognized that a taking does not occur where the government
exercises its unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner from
using his property to injure others without having to compensate the
value of the forbidden use.”35 He insisted again, however, that the
exception was a “narrow” one, confined to circumstances in which
the government sought to prevent “a misuse or illegal use.”36 In
addition, he asserted that the issue of the legitimacy of a regulation’s
purpose is a question of federal, not state, law “subject to
independent scrutiny by this Court.”37
By the time the Court decided Lucas in 1992, some version of a
rule immunizing from takings liability a regulation directed at a
harm-producing activity seemed well entrenched, even if the scope of
that immunity was the subject of ongoing debate. The Penn Central
opinion contained a single cryptic footnote in which the majority cast
doubt on the viability of the distinction between a regulation that
seeks to prevent harm and one that seeks to extract public benefits.
33. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. Id.
35. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, who
subsequently denied the existence of a noxious-like use exception as a shield in Lucas, joined in
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent.
36. Id. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Curtis v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86
(1911)).
37. Id.
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The point was not critical to the majority’s analysis,38 however, and
in any event it only served to expand, not contract, the scope of
government regulation that may escape takings liability by
recognizing that a harm-prevention rationale is not a prerequisite to
the ability to regulate without compensation. Moreover, all
reservations seemed to have been cast aside by the time the Court
decided Keystone, a case in which all nine Justices signed onto some
form of the principle that harm-producing activity is the appropriate
target of non-compensable police power regulation.
B. The Impact of Lucas on the Status of the Harm-Prevention
Principle
The Supreme Court confronted the role of a harm-prevention
rationale for regulation directly in the Lucas decision.39 In 1986
Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, South
Carolina, for a price of nearly one million dollars. Two years later, as
an erosion control measure, the state adopted the Beachfront
Management Act, which prevented Lucas from building homes on
either lot. The trial court found that the application of the statute to
Lucas’s land rendered it valueless.40 The state Supreme Court
accepted as determinative the legislature’s finding that new
construction on the coastal zone threatened public resources and
concluded that no compensation was due when a regulation of private
property is designed to prevent serious public harm, regardless of the
degree of the economic impact on the regulated property.41
The Supreme Court, Justice Scalia writing for a five-member
majority, enunciated a categorical rule pursuant to which a regulation
that denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is a
38. After denying the relevance of the “noxious” quality of the uses in cases like
Hadacheck, for example, the Court added that destruction of a historic landmark could be
regarded as a harmful activity. See supra note 26. Thus, even if the majority meant to deny the
existence of a nuisance exception, its effort to do so can be regarded as dictum. Moreover, the
majority’s explanation of the significance of cases like Mugler and Hadacheck may have been
intended to amplify, not constrict, the scope of state authority to regulate without compensation.
See Davis & Glicksman, supra note 32, at 433.
39. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
40. Id. at 1007.
41. Id. at 1010. The state supreme court cited Mugler, among other cases.
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per se taking.42 Responding to the state court’s reliance on the harm-
preventing character of the regulation that restricted Lucas’s
development, the Court cited the Penn Central footnote described
above. It discounted the significance of prior suggestions that
“harmful or noxious uses” of property could be prevented without
triggering a Fourteenth Amendment (in the case of state or local
regulation) obligation to compensate. The “harmful or noxious use”
principle was simply an “early attempt to describe in theoretical
terms why government may, consistent with the Takings Clause,
affect property values by regulation without incurring an obligation
to compensate— a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with
respect to the full scope of the State’s police power.”43 Thus,
“harmful or noxious use” analysis was “simply the progenitor of our
more contemporary statements that land use regulation does not
effect a taking if it substantially advances legitimate state interests.”44
According to the Lucas majority, the Court moved away from
reliance on a noxious use characterization precisely because “the
distinction between ‘harm-preventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’
regulation is often in the eye of the beholder.”45 Indeed, the concerns
that prompted enactment of the Beachfront Management Act could fit
comfortably under either rubric: the state may have been trying to
prevent Lucas from using his land to harm the state’s ecological
resources, or it may have been trying to procure the benefits of an
ecological preserve.46 The choice of characterization depends largely
on “one’s evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real estate.”47
These considerations led ineluctably to the conclusion that “noxious-
use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory
‘takings’— which require compensation— from regulatory
deprivations that do not require compensation.”48 The state’s
42. Id. at 1015.
43. Id. at 1022-23.
44. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023-24. That statement is part of a two-part test for regulatory
takings enunciated in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), where the Court
indicated that a taking occurs if regulation “does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”
45. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1025.
48. Id. at 1026.
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recitation of a noxious-use justification could not, therefore, provide
a basis for a departure from the per se rule that a regulation that
causes a complete deprivation of economic value is a taking.49
Apparently dispensing once and for all50 with a nuisance
exception from takings liability, the majority nevertheless, in
virtually the same breath, reinjected the nuisance-like character of the
regulated property back into the takings equation.51 The state could
avoid the per se rule “only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with.”52 The Court had already
recognized that a permanent physical occupation gives rise to a per se
taking, without regard to the strength of the governmental interest in
such an occupation.53 A confiscatory regulation— one that results in a
complete denial of economically beneficial use— has the same
practical effect as such an occupation:
Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A
law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in
the courts— by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected
persons) under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the
State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that
affect the public generally, or otherwise.54
If regulation is directed at a use already restricted by these
“background principles,” it cannot be a taking because the regulated
property owner never had a right to engage in the particular use. “The
49. Id
50. This is so until the next takings case with a reconfigured Supreme Court majority.
51. In Justice Stevens’ words, “the categorical rule established in this case is only
‘categorical’ for a page or two in the U.S. Reports.” Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia declared that a noxious-use justification could not be the basis for departing from the
categorical rule. Id. at 1026. On the very next page of the opinion, he enunciated the “logically
antecedent inquiry” described immediately below. Id. at 1027.
52. Id. at 1027.
53. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
54. 505 U.S. at 1029.
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use of these properties for what are now expressly prohibited
purposes was always unlawful, and (subject to other constitutional
limitations) it was open to the State at any point to make the
implication of those background principles of nuisance and property
law explicit.”55 But when regulation proscribes uses consistent with
these background principles “compensation must be paid to sustain
it.”56 The Court remanded the case to the state court to determine
whether any background principles of nuisance and property law
already proscribed the uses prohibited by the Beachfront
Management Act.57
The Lucas majority purported to rely on the footnote in Penn
Central that seemed to cast aside the harm-benefit distinction. The
effect of the Court’s rejection of the distinction in Lucas, however,
contrasts markedly with the impact of the renunciation of a harm-
benefit dichotomy in Penn Central. In the earlier case, the majority
indicated that the presence of a harm-prevention rationale provides
no stronger reason to reject a takings claim than the presence of a
benefit-extraction rationale. In either situation the enacting
governmental entity may withstand a takings challenge by showing
that it employed a non-discriminatory approach and relied on an
appropriately weighty police power justification. Under Penn
Central’s three-part balancing test, if the police power justification is
strong enough, the government can impose regulation without having
to provide compensation, even if the effect of the regulation is to
cause significant diminution in value. Under Lucas the character of
the regulation is relevant to the threshold task of defining the
regulated property interest. If the regulated activity is tantamount to a
nuisance, the regulated entity never possessed the right to engage in
the activity in the first place. But only harm-prevention measures, not
other kinds of police power enactments, “inhere” in title in this
manner. Furthermore, a government adopting a non-harm prevention
measure that results in denial of all economically beneficial use may
55. Id. at 1030.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1031-32. The state supreme court determined that they did not and ordered the
trial court to award damages for a temporary taking. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
424 S.E.2d 484 (1992).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/7
p149+Glicksman.doc 01/04/01
2000] Making a Nuisance of Takings Law 161
never avoid the categorical taking rule announced in Lucas on the
basis of the strength of the public interest behind the enactment.
A close analysis of the Lucas “nuisance exception” reveals that
the majority indicated compensation is required for restrictions that
extend beyond the relevant background principles that are “newly
legislated.” Although the majority did not define what it meant by
“new legislation,” one possibility is that it meant legislation adopted
after the property owner alleging the taking acquired an interest in the
property.58 The implication is that legislative restrictions that pre-date
the acquired interest may be used to define the parameters of the
property interest that was allegedly taken. The background principles
that inhere in title are those of the state’s property and nuisance law.
Must those principles emanate from the common law, or may they
have a statutory or regulatory derivation? Justice Blackmun, in
dissent, understood the majority to confine the relevant background
principles to those derived from common law. He complained that
the majority swept aside venerable precedents dating back more than
a century in ruling that “the government’s power to act without
paying compensation turns on whether the prohibited activity is a
common-law nuisance.”59 Blackmun added that one cannot make a
judgment on whether a use amounts to a common law nuisance
without engaging in the same kinds of value-laden judgments that
make the distinction between a harm-preventing and a benefit-
conferring measure depend on the eye of the beholder.60 But the
majority’s reference to “newly legislated” restrictions appears to
leave room, as indicated above, for consideration of pre-existing
regulatory measures in defining the relevant property interest.
Further, the majority did not actually require that a use must have
been decreed a nuisance by a common law court to be free from the
categorical rule. It is enough that a regulatory measure “duplicate the
result that could have been achieved in the courts.”61 Who decides
whether a regulation achieves such duplication? Legislative
58. See William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1408
(1993).
59. 505 U.S. at 1052 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1053 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1029.
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declaration that the regulated activity is nuisance-like will not
necessarily suffice. In Lucas the Court lent no credence to the South
Carolina legislature’s determination that the statute was necessary to
avoid harm to important public resources.62 Thus, independent
judicial scrutiny is appropriate under the Lucas approach.63
C. Mandelker’s Take on Lucas
Dan Mandelker’s reaction to Lucas, which appeared less than a
year after the decision, was less than charitable. Although he
applauded Justice Scalia’s rejection of the harm-benefit test,64 he
regarded the decision as a whole to be insufficiently solicitous of
government’s “legitimate interest in regulation.”65 Professor
Mandelker took particular issue with the presumption of
constitutionality of land use regulation that it effected:
Before Lucas, the legislature had the authority to declare what
is and what is not in the public interest, and this declaration
was presumptively constitutional. Now, as Justice Scalia made
plain in Lucas, the courts will determine whether a total
deprivation is defensible under the taking clause by applying
nuisance law. The presumption is reversed, if not discarded,
because legislative declarations of governmental purpose have
no standing in the decision on a taking claim.66
Lucas, therefore, shifted the authority to determine what is a
legitimate governmental purpose from the legislature to the courts,
crippling the legislative role in defining the limits of governmental
62. “A fortiori the legislature’s recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis
for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated. If it
were, departure would virtually always be allowed.” Id. at 1026.
63. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512 (stating that the issue of the legitimacy of a regulation’s
purpose is a question of federal, not state law, “subject to independent scrutiny by this Court”).
64. Of Mice and Missiles, supra note 8, at 293. Mandelker also found Justice Scalia’s
rejection of the test “puzzling,” however, because it is a rule that “favors landowners in their
taking clause battles.” According to Mandelker, the demise of the rule allows courts to conclude
that regulations that do not deprive a landowner of all economically beneficial use do not
amount to a taking based on a pragmatic balancing process, even if they confer a public benefit.
Id. at 295.
65. Id. at 287.
66. Id. at 300 (footnotes omitted).
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intervention in the private land use market.67 Mandelker, like Justice
Blackmun,68 found Justice Scalia’s endorsement of the nuisance
exception to the categorical rule for total economic deprivations to be
inconsistent with his rationale for jettisoning the harm-benefit rule
because both are equally subject to the criticism that it is impossible
to construct a neutral baseline from which they can operate.
Similarly, although Justice Scalia “was adamant on the need for a per
se taking rule” to dispose of total deprivation cases, “he adopted a
nuisance exception that invokes an equity regime in which balancing
of interests is the hallmark of decision making.”69 In the final
analysis, Mandelker charged that Lucas presages further doctrinal
revision that “substantially and improperly enhances the protection of
property under the taking clause” by vitiating a presumption of
constitutionality and undercutting judicial deference to legislative
judgments that served to protect government from assault under the
taking clause.70
Professor Mandelker’s greatest concern with Lucas appears to be
its shifting of the power to determine when a regulation of private
property requires the payment of just compensation from legislative
and administrative regulatory bodies to the judiciary. One means by
which this shift is accomplished is the limitation placed on the
nuisance exception such that only regulatory restrictions that
duplicate limitations that already existed at common law, or that a
court declares to be the equivalent of those that existed at common
law, can shield the government from a taking claim in a case
otherwise subject to the per se rule for total economic deprivations.
The next part of this essay analyzes the cases that have been decided
since Lucas to see how the courts have interpreted the scope of the
nuisance exception to the categorical rule. In particular, the focus is
on assessing whether Lucas has become the “destructive missile” that
Professor Mandelker feared by prompting a significant reallocation of
67. Id. at 302.
68. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
69. Of Mice and Missiles, supra note 8, at 302.
70. Id. at 306.
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authority to accommodate conflicting land uses from the legislatures
to the courts.71
II. THE FATE OF THE NUISANCE EXCEPTION
A. Which Background Principles of Property and Nuisance Law are
“Relevant”?
The majority opinion in Lucas interpreted the Constitution to
provide protection against a taking challenge for a regulation that
eliminates all economically productive use, as long as the regulation
only proscribes productive uses “previously permissible under
relevant property and nuisance law principles.”72 Compensation is not
required for the imposition of such restrictions because “[t]he use of
these properties for what are now expressly prohibited purposes was
always unlawful, and . . . it was open to the State at any point to make
the implication of those background principles of nuisance and
property law explicit.”73
The obvious question is how to define the body of background
law that is “relevant” to the definition of the baseline property rights
held by the regulated property owner. Justice Scalia’s answer in
Lucas seems to be that the only relevant body of law is state common
law. He asserted that this result is consistent with the Court’s
tradition of resolving takings questions by reference to “the
understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the
State’s power over, the ‘bundle of rights’ that they acquire when they
obtain title to property.”74 In particular, the Court has traditionally
resorted to “’existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law’ to define the range of interests
that qualify for protection as ‘property’ under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.”75
71. Id.
72. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30.
73. Id. at 1030.
74. Id. at 1027. According to one critic of Lucas, this justification amounts to little more
than saying that “whatever the Court wants the result to be can always be accommodated.”
Edward J. Sullivan, Lucas and Creative Constitutional Interpretation, 23 ENVTL. L. 919, 922
(1993).
75. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (citing, inter alia, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
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State regulatory legislation is arguably just as “independent” of
federal constitutional doctrines restricting government power as
common law. The position that only common law rights are
“relevant” to the task of defining the realm of interests that qualify
for protection as property must be based on the view that the common
law creates a body of inviolate, baseline rights76 in a way that
statutory or regulatory law does not, even if the latter already existed
at the time the regulated property owner acquired the interest. But, as
Professor Richard Levy has argued, the notion that the common law
functions as a constitutional baseline is undercut by the Supreme
Court’s recognition that “the common law itself was merely a
regulatory regime in which the government chose to prefer some
interests over others.”77 Levy asserts that the Court’s rejection78 of
Lochner v. New York79 constituted an implicit renunciation of the
view that “property rights are natural rights that exist independently
of government action in favor of the recognition that property rights
are created by the common law, which is merely one of many
possible regulatory system regimes.”80 In short, “there is no
577 (1972)).
76. See, e.g., Sax, Economy of Nature, supra note 19, at 1441 (describing Lucas as
consistent with the view that property ownership entails “some irreducible right of use by the
private landowner”).
77. Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward A Coherent Jurisprudence of
Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 391 (1995).
78. Indeed, even in the midst of the ascendancy of Lochner and its progeny, the Court
concluded that a brickyard that did not amount to a nuisance per se could not assert a “vested
interest” against the exercise of the police power as the basis for a claim for just compensation.
The court explicitly rejected the contention that “a necessary and lawful occupation that is not a
nuisance per se cannot be made so by legislative declaration.” Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
79. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
80. Levy, supra note 77, at 391. The courts have recognized in other contexts that
common law assignments of rights are tantamount to regulatory requirements adopted by
legislative or administrative bodies. See, e.g., Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir.
1993) (holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
136y (1994), preempted common law tort claims based on inadequate packaging or labeling
because damage awards based on such claims amount to “requirements” within the meaning of
statutory preemption provision). See also Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that common law breach of implied warranty claim was preempted by the same
statute). Justice Scalia’s efforts to shield common law assignments of rights from legislative
alteration are not limited to his takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Property
Myths, Judicial Activism, and the Lucas Case, 23 ENVTL. L. 907, 915 (1993) (noting that
Justice Scalia’s “assault on legislative attempts to change the common law model of public and
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constitutional reason to prefer the common law over any other
regulatory regime.”81 The position that common law property rights
form an inviolate baseline for assessing the validity of takings
challenges is also undercut by the Court’s own recognition that
common law property rights change over time.82 More specifically,
the “Blackstonian expectation” that common law property rights vest
in their holders an expectation of unrestricted development has
eroded over time.83
Land use regulation serves as a means of accommodating
potentially conflicting uses of land. For example, a zoning ordinance
that designates an area for exclusive residential use reflects a
legislative judgment that the public interest is best served by
preventing commercial and industrial uses from imposing adverse
impacts on residential uses in that locality, and vice versa.84 When a
real property owner attacks the imposition of regulatory restrictions
as a compensable taking, the owner is challenging the right of the
government to resolve the conflict against the owner without paying
for that right. If the Supreme Court in Lucas intended to limit the
private rights with respect to land and environmental regulation” is reflected in his approach to
principles of standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution). See also FREDERICK R.
ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 118-19 (3d ed. 1999).
81. Levy, supra note 77, at 392. See also id. at 391 n.257 (“Put simply, if property rights
are created by society through the governmental establishment of a legal regime to protect
them, there can be no natural right to any particular property regime.”). Levy attacks the
viability of the harm-benefit distinction as a basis for resolving takings claims on the same
grounds, arguing that determining whether a regulation prevents a harm or confers a benefit
depends upon the baseline from which the impact is measured. Id. at 392 n.259.
82. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (explaining that “changed circumstances or new knowledge
may make what was previously permissible no longer so”).
83. A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?, 60
U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 589 (1993). See also Sax, Economy of Nature, supra note 19, at 1446-49
(describing how definitions of property have “continuously adjusted to reflect new economic
and social structures, often to the disadvantage of existing owners”). Accordingly, Sax
characterizes the view of property reflected in Lucas as outdated and the case’s ultimate
resolution as “inept.” Id. at 1455.
84. The problem is a reciprocal one because if two uses, A and B, are truly incompatible,
then a governmental entity seeking to resolve the conflict must either allow A to inflict harm on
B or preclude A from doing so, thereby inflicting harm (in the form of the inability to pursue
the desired use) on A. Thus, according to Michael Blumm, the recognition, hinted at in Lucas,
that there is a fundamental right to develop property “would be a curious result because if there
is a fundamental right to develop property, and there are two landowners whose developments
conflict, whose right is more fundamental?” Blumm, supra note 80, at 913. See generally
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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nuisance exception to background principles of the common law of
property, it afforded the state judiciary the authority to resolve such
conflicts through total deprivation of economically beneficial use
without triggering constitutional damage liability, but precluded the
legislature (or an administrative body) from doing so.
Prior to Lucas, however, the Supreme Court had reached the
conclusion that all regulatory means of resolving land use conflicts,
including common law means, stood on equal footing. Miller v.
Schoene, a 1928 decision, illustrates the point.85 Acting under the
authority of a Virginia statute, the state entomologist ordered the
owners of ornamental red cedar trees to cut them down in order to
prevent a rust with which the trees were infected from spreading to
nearby apple orchards, even though the rust had no effect on the host
trees. The statute required the destruction as a public nuisance of any
red cedar trees infected with fungal rust if the trees were located
within a defined proximity to apple orchards. At the time of the
dispute, “[a]pple growing [was] one of the principal agricultural
pursuits in Virginia.”86 The owners of the cedar trees claimed a right
to compensation. The Supreme Court upheld the state Supreme
Court’s refusal to find a taking. The Court recognized that “the state
was under the necessity of making a choice between the preservation
of one class of property and that of the other wherever both existed in
dangerous proximity.”87 The state could have chosen not to require
destruction of the rust-ridden cedars, but by doing so it would have
permitted serious injury to the nearby apple orchards to go
unchecked.
When forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its
constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one
class of property in order to save another which, in the
judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public. It
will not do to say that the case is merely one of a conflict
between two private interests and that the misfortune of apple
growers may not be shifted to cedar owners by ordering the
85. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
86. Id. at 279.
87. Id.
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destruction of their property; for it is obvious that there may
be, and that here there is, a preponderant public concern in the
preservation of the one interest over the other. And where the
public interest is involved preferment of that interest over the
property interest of the individual, to the extent even of its
destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every
exercise of the police power which affects property.88
The Court explicitly declined to assess “whether the infected
cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law.”89 Such
an assessment was not “relevant” to the determination of whether the
mandated destruction of the cedar trees triggered an obligation to
compensate. The state had to make a choice between two conflicting
property interests, and the legislature’s decision to favor the apple
orchards over the cedar trees was determinative. The Court did not
consider the possibility that the statutory declaration of a public
nuisance simply duplicated pre-existing common law nuisance
restrictions on an externality-generating land use because a finding of
such duplication was not a prerequisite to denial of the taking claim.
Miller is consistent with the view that the state may act as an
arbiter of disputes among potentially conflicting land uses without
being forced to compensate the loser.90 Despite the fact that it did not
overrule Miller, or even cast doubt on its continuing validity, Lucas
appears to restrict the dispute resolution mechanisms that are capable
of avoiding an obligation to compensate to those that derive from
pre-acquisition common law principles of nuisance and property law.
Professor Mandelker, as well as other legal commentators91 and the
majority of the lower federal court and state judges that have
addressed the scope of Lucas’s nuisance exception, have sensed an
insufficient explanation for this restriction.
88. Id. at 279-80 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 280.
90. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 69-70 (1964).
91. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 80; Fisher, supra note 58, at 1405-08; William Funk,
Revolution or Restatement? Awaiting Answers to Lucas’ Unanswered Questions, 23 ENVTL. L.
891, 897-900 (1993); Donald Large, Lucas: A Flawed Attempt to Redefine the Mahon Analysis,
23 ENVTL. L. 883 (1993); Lazarus, supra note 12, at 1418-21, 1426 (characterizing the portion
of the Lucas opinion that rejected the harm-benefit distinction but adopted the nuisance
exception as “a shell game”).
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B. The Expansion of the Lucas Nuisance Exception
1. Post-Lucas Judicial Interpretation of the Nuisance Exception
Instances of land use and environmental regulation that result in
total denials of economically beneficial use are relatively rare.92 As a
result, the impact of the categorical taking rule announced in Lucas is
likely to be less dramatic than an overhaul of the Penn Central ad hoc
balancing test that applies to regulations having an adverse economic
impact on the regulated property that is less substantial than a
complete deprivation of such use. Within the realm of cases to which
the Lucas analytical framework applies, the impact of that framework
obviously would be relatively greater if the nuisance exception were
interpreted narrowly rather than broadly. One way for the lower
federal courts and state courts to confine the scope of the nuisance
exception would be to limit the “background principles” of state
nuisance and property law that inhere in title (and thus provide a
shield against taking liability) to those that existed under the common
law in effect at the time the landowner asserting a taking purchased
the regulated property.
By and large courts have not adopted this kind of approach,
although the lack of uniformity reflected in the cases is indicative of
the confusion that Lucas has spawned and, perhaps, of the less than
convincing explanation provided by the Court for its treatment of the
nuisance exception to the categorical rule. My less than systematic
survey of the cases revealed only a few post-Lucas decisions in
which courts refused to consider a restriction that was not based in
common law as a limiting background principle. In one of those
cases, K & K Construction, Inc., J.F.K. v. Department of Natural
Resources, the state denied a permit that would have allowed the
plaintiff to build a restaurant on a portion of its land that contained
wetlands protected by state statute.93 When the plaintiff claimed a
compensable taking, the state responded that construction was barred
by the state constitution, which amounted to a “fundamental
principle” of state property law. The state constitution declared the
92. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 1427.
93. 551 N.W.2d 413 (Mich. App. 1996).
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conservation and development of the state’s natural resources to be of
paramount public concern and authorized the legislature to provide
for their protection.94 The Michigan appellate court held that the
constitutional provision was not a principle of nuisance and property
law for purposes of the Lucas exception. The decision to build a
restaurant on wetlands did not constitute an abatable nuisance and the
court was not aware of any “common-law principle” preventing the
construction.95 According to the court’s conclusory reasoning, “the
generalized invocation of public interests in the state constitution and
the Legislature’s declarations in the [W]etlands Protection Statute]
. . . do not constitute background principles of nuisance and property
law sufficient to prohibit the use of plaintiffs’ land without just
compensation.”96 The court’s decision lost all precedential value,
however, when the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed on the
ground that the permit denial did not result in a denial of all
economically viable use and, therefore, no categorical taking had
occurred.97
In Preseault v. United States the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit adopted the same approach.98 In Preseault, the United States
sought to avoid taking liability for deferring abandonment of a
railroad easement through operation of the Rails-to-Trails Act.99 The
government argued that background principles of federal law
reflected in federal transportation regulatory statutes precluded the
owners of the reversion from insisting on immediate abandonment.
The court disagreed, insisting that “[t]he background principles
referred to by the Court in Lucas were state-defined nuisance
94. Id. at 417.
95. Id.
96. Id. Why doesn’t a state constitutional provision authorizing legislative action to
protect important public natural resources reflect “the understandings of our citizens regarding
the content of, and the State’s power over, the ‘bundle of rights’ that they acquire when they
obtain title to property”? Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
97. K & K Constr., Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich.
1998). The court remanded so that the trial court could make the factual findings necessary to
permit application of the three-part Penn Central balancing test for non-categorical takings. Id.
at 539-40.
98. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For further discussion of
Preseault, see GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 17.05[4] (1990).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1994).
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rules.”100 Lucas did not support the position that these background
principles include “the sweep of a century of federal regulatory
legislation.” Moreover, the landowners’ use of their property did not
amount to a public nuisance under “traditional nuisance concepts” so
as to justify immunizing regulation from operation of Lucas’s
categorical rule.101 The court limited the impact of its ruling,
however, by confining its analysis to physical occupation cases, not
regulatory takings cases involving questions concerning the scope of
the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.102
The Court of Federal Claims subsequently reached a similar result
in Maritrans Inc. v. United States, a case involving federal regulation
of personal property.103 The issue in Maritrans was whether the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990104 and its implementing regulations effectuated
a taking of the plaintiffs’ non-self-propelled tank vessels by requiring
that single-hulled vessels be retrofitted to double hulls. The United
States claimed that the plaintiffs possessed no property rights to be
taken in light of the history of extensive regulation of the industry.
The court stated, however, that “[t]he inquiry into limitations
inhering in an owner’s title is made by referencing state property or
nuisance law and federal law.”105 The government cited a string of
statutes, dating back to the 1800s, that regulated shipping activities,
but the court found those laws irrelevant to the takings issue. Long-
standing Coast Guard regulation of oil tankers did not establish a
common law prohibition against using the vessels without double
hulls.106 Because the government could not show that operation of the
vessels would have amounted to a common law nuisance, it failed to
address the rights that attached to ownership of vessels independently
of the applicable regulatory framework. The plaintiffs, therefore, held
100. Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1538.
101. Id. at 1539.
102. Id. at 1540. Compare Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App.
1996) (concluding that state environmental agency did not engage in a taking when it entered
mine site to assist EPA in moving waste rock pile and plugging tunnels and shafts because use
of the site in a way that created significant environmental problems amounted to a nuisance
under principles of state property law).
103. 40 Fed. Cl. 790 (1998).
104. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484.
105. 40 Fed. Cl. at 793 n.7.
106. Id. at 799.
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a Fifth Amendment property interest in their vessels.107
In another recent decision, Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United
States,108 the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the application
of the Clean Water Act’s (CWA) section 404 dredge and fill permit
program109 worked a taking of a developer’s land, but in so holding,
the court recognized that pre-acquisition statutory programs are just
as relevant as common law principles of nuisance and property law.
Florida Rock addressed the constitutionality of the Corps of
Engineers’ denial of the plaintiff’s application to mine limestone on a
property that was composed largely of wetlands. The plaintiff
acquired the property in September 1972, one month before Congress
adopted the CWA. The landowner acquired all necessary state and
local permits, but because of a slump in the mining industry delayed
efforts to mine until 1978. Later that year, the Corps issued a cease
and desist order to halt mining, stating that a section 404 permit was
necessary. After the Corps denied the plaintiff’s application, the
plaintiff filed suit alleging a taking.110 The government argued that it
need not compensate Florida Rock because it established that the
mining would have been injurious to the public health and safety, as
defined by Congress. The court responded that, for purposes of the
takings clause, nuisance law “is not simply defined by Congress,
whenever it declares that a use should not occur. The government’s
argument would enable Congress to pass laws which eliminate
property rights retroactively as if those rights never existed in the first
place.”111 Instead, the government must show a limit on plaintiff’s
property rights which inhered in the title at the time of the plaintiff’s
acquisition of the property in order to avoid compensating the
plaintiff.
107. Id. at 801. The court refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s taking claim. In a subsequent
phase of the case, the court held that the mere passage of the double hull provisions of the Oil
Pollution Act did not amount to a taking. Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 86 (1999).
108. 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999). For an earlier phase of the case, see Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
110. Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 25-26.
111. Id. at 28-29. Nor could “the artful recitation of a harm-preventing or benefit-
conferring justification transform compensable government action into that which is not
compensable.” Id. at 29.
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Unlike the courts in K & K Construction, Preseault, and
Maritrans, the Florida Rock court concluded that statutory
restrictions were just as relevant as those originating at common law.
The enactment of a federal statute restricting the landowner’s use
rights before its acquisition of the property allegedly taken would
affect the owner’s expectations.112 In this case, however, the CWA
was not enacted until after Florida Rock acquired its land. Similarly,
the court considered whether the regulated activities amounted to a
nuisance under state law and held that they did not. In so holding, the
court analyzed not only state common law doctrine, but also a
“relevant” public nuisance statute.113 The court held that the plaintiff
had a compensable right to mine limestone,114 but it explicitly
acknowledged the relevance of federal and state statutory law in
determining what limitations “inhered” in the landowner’s title.
The same court that decided Florida Rock also considered state
legislation relevant to the task of defining the scope of the owner’s
property in Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, in which a takings
claim was soundly rejected.115 The plaintiff in Rith Energy applied
for a surface mining permit under the Federal Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act.116 The Office of Surface Mining (OSM) denied
the permit because of the applicant’s inability to formulate an
acceptable plan for managing acidic overburden. Rith claimed that
the denial was a taking. The issue, in the court’s view, was whether
the denial paralleled a result that could have been achieved under the
state’s nuisance law. “To put it most simply, would Tennessee
nuisance law sanction the issuance of an injunction restraining Rith
from proceeding with a surface mining operation given an
adjudicated finding that, because of an inadequate handling plan,
‘there would [be] a high probability [of] acid mine drainage into [the
aquifer]’?”117
112. Id. at 29 (citing M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
113. The court added that the plaintiff’s proposed activity was not alleged to violate any
other Florida laws either. “Thus, the court finds that plaintiff’s activity was, except for the
Corps’ denial, permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles.” Id. at 30.
114. Id. at 31.
115. 44 Fed. Cl. 108, reconsideration denied, 44 Fed. Cl. 366 (1999).
116. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
117. 44 Fed. Cl. at 114.
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The court held that the answer was yes. The court relied primarily
on the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act of 1977, a statute that
recognized the waters of the state as property of the state held in
public trust and subject to a right of the state’s people to unpolluted
waters. This statute declared certain activities that pollute the state’s
waters to be a public nuisance.118 The court found it “virtually self-
evident that OSM’s denial of a mining permit to plaintiff, because of
the high probability of acid mine drainage into [the aquifer],
represented an exercise of regulatory authority indistinguishable in
purpose and result from that to which plaintiff was always subject
under Tennessee nuisance law.”119 The court thus used state statutes
to define the parameters of the state’s common law of nuisance. The
court hammered the point home in its subsequent denial of
reconsideration, maintaining that the statutory restrictions on use of
the state’s water resources “do not represent a set of newly-
proclaimed tenets of public nuisance law. To the contrary, activities
that cause the pollution of domestic waters have long been
recognized by the courts of Tennessee to be contrary to the public’s
health and safety and therefore enjoinable as a nuisance.”120 It
mattered not whether enforcement of these restrictions was
accomplished by federal or state officials.
The property use that was denied here, the conduct of a surface
mining operation that held out a “high probability” of
introducing acid mine drainage into [the aquifer], is not a
property use plaintiff could legitimately claim it had a right to
pursue in consonance with relevant state property and nuisance
principles.121
118. Id. at 114-15.
119. Id. at 115.
120. 44 Fed. Cl. at 366.
121. Id. at 367. The Colorado Supreme Court reached a similar result in State Department.
of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1995). The plaintiff owned a parcel on which
uranium milling operations had once been conducted. The property was subsequently used as
an uranium mill tailings disposal site. The tailings pile was subject to state regulation, and the
state placed restrictions on use of the site. The owner sued, claiming the restrictions amounted
to a taking because they did not permit a reasonable economic return on the property, which it
had been leasing for coal storage. The court found that a property owner on notice of
government regulatory authority cannot reasonably expect to avoid regulation or put property to
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In another case, a federal district court held that the “relevant”
distinction is the one between pre- and post-acquisition legal
restraints, not the one that turns on the identity of the governmental
entity adopting the restraints. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency122  involved the imposition
of restrictions on the ability to develop land in the vicinity of Lake
Tahoe. An association of Tahoe area property owners alleged that
several ordinances enacted by an agency created by the Tahoe
Regional Planning Compact took their property.123 The agency
adopted an ordinance that, pending development of a new regional
land use plan, temporarily prohibited most residential and
commercial development on lands susceptible to environmentally
damaging soil erosion into Lake Tahoe. The moratorium lasted about
eight months, until a new regional plan was adopted. A version of the
moratorium was subsequently extended. The issue was whether the
restrictions deprived the plaintiffs of economically viable use of their
properties so as to amount to a categorical taking under Lucas.124
The court found that the regulated property did not retain any
economically beneficial or productive use.125 It accordingly turned to
a use that constitutes a nuisance, even if that is the only economically viable use for the
property. Id. at 1001. “Relevant” state common law principles would not permit a landowner to
engage in activities that spread radioactive contamination because that body of law places on
landowners a duty to prevent conditions on their land from creating an unreasonable risk of
harm to others. In particular, Colorado common law rendered land uses that cause pollution
nuisance-like. More to the present point, the court reasoned that improperly handled radioactive
materials were treated as a public nuisance under Colorado solid waste statutes enacted before
The Mill purchased the site:
Under these principles of Colorado nuisance law, the right to make any use of the
property that would create a hazard to public health by spreading radioactive
contamination was excluded from The Mill’s title at the onset. . . . Accordingly, any
use limitations suggested by [the state] to avoid the spreading of radioactive
contamination could not have constituted a taking because those uses were never
lawfully available to The Mill even in the absence of [state regulatory] action.
Id. at 1002.
122. 34 F. Supp.2d 1226 (D. Nev. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 2000
WL 770512 (9th Cir. June 15, 2000).
123. Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980).
124. 34 F. Supp.2d at 1240.
125. Id. at 1245. As this article went to press, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision affirming
in part and reversing in part the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
moratorium did not result in a denial of all economically beneficial use, and therefore did not
amount to a categorical taking. The court did not address the applicability of the Lucas nuisance
Washington University Open Scholarship
p149+Glicksman.doc 01/04/01
176 Festschrift [Vol. 3:149
the agency’s affirmative defense that the harm it intended to prevent
(the eutrophication of the lake) constituted a nuisance under pre-
existing state law and, thus, fell within the nuisance exception of
Lucas.126 The court reasoned that if, at the time the land is purchased,
certain uses are restricted or barred, “then the purchaser of that
property does not acquire the right to put the land to one of those
forbidden uses. Those uses are not part of the ‘bundle of rights’
which the purchaser received with the land.”127 If the purchaser
nevertheless engages in prohibited uses, the government can stop the
uses without incurring liability for a taking, even if those uses are the
only economically viable ones. The easy case is one in which the use
would have amounted to a common law nuisance; in such a case, the
state can prohibit the use without effecting a taking. The court added
that:
[w]hat the Lucas opinion does not make completely clear, but
which most courts since appear to have accepted, is that
“newly legislated or decreed” restrictions on land use can also
constitute “background principles” of state law for this
purpose— so long as those restrictions became law before the
property owner actually purchased the property subject to the
restrictions. In such a case, the prior owner of the property may
have had a valid takings claim, but subsequent purchasers
probably will not.128
Thus, an agency seeking to establish that its actions do not require
the payment of just compensation under the nuisance exception must
demonstrate that the prohibited uses could have been prohibited
either by the state common law of nuisance or by “some affirmative
state or local ordinance prohibiting such uses, which was enacted
exception. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 2000
WL 770512 (9th Cir. June 15, 2000).
126. The court recognized that “since Lucas, debate has raged over whether the ‘exception’
. . . should still be referred to as the ‘nuisance’ exception, or as something else . . . . We find this
dispute to be of no moment . . . . For the sake of convenience, we refer to the exception as the
‘nuisance exception,’ fully aware that the exception, whatever it is called, is not the same post-
Lucas as it was prior thereto.” Id. at 1251 n.4.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1251-52 (citations omitted).
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prior to the plaintiffs’ acquisition of their property.”129 The court then
turned to California and Nevada statutes for the definition of
nuisance. It ultimately concluded that the planned construction did
not qualify because, although development would change the color of
the lake water, there was no proof that it would create a health hazard
or otherwise be indecent or offensive.130 The court also found that
state statutes controlling waste discharges into water, thereby
modifying the common law definition of a nuisance, did not apply to
the activities in this case.131 The court concluded by stating that if any
plaintiff purchased land after adoption of the agency’s restrictive
ordinance, the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation
because the ordinance “would appear to constitute a ‘background
principle of state law’ applicable to all subsequent purchasers, who
are presumed to have knowledge of all such restrictions.”132
The weight of post-Lucas state court authority reveals the same
broad interpretation of the nuisance exception.133 The Virginia
Supreme Court in City of Virginia Beach v. Bell, for example, also
focused on whether the plaintiff bought land before the adoption of
an environmental protection scheme, not on whether that scheme
129. Id. at 1252.
130. 34 F Supp.2d at 1253.
131. Id. at 1254-55.
132. Id. at 1255.
133. In several cases state courts have assessed whether the nuisance exception shielded the
government from takings liability solely by reference to state common law. In Boise Cascade
Corp. v. Oregon, 991 P.2d 563 (Or. App. 1999), the state refused to permit logging on the
plaintiff’s land due to the presence of a spotted owl nest. The court upheld the trial court’s
decision to strike the state’s defense that the proposed logging would have constituted a
nuisance, thus shielding the state from taking liability. The state offered no support for its
assertion that knocking down a bird’s nest on one’s property was ever regarded as a public
nuisance. There is also no indication that any pre-acquisition statutory or regulatory restrictions
were brought to the court’s attention. In another case, the court did not need to address the
“relevance” of pre-acquisition statutory law because it held that background principles of state
property law were sufficient to defeat the takings claim. See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,
854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (finding that denial of permits to build seawall was not a taking
because the common law doctrine of custom, recognized in State ex Rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462
P.2d 671 (Or. 1969), was a background principle that limited ownership rights, and the plaintiff
purchased its land subject to those rights). Cf. Raynor v. Maryland Dep’t of Health and Mental
Hygiene, 676 A.2d 978, 991 (Md. App. 1996) (holding that state agency’s seizure and
destruction of pet ferret to determine whether it had rabies was not a compensable taking
because the action was intended to abate a common law public nuisance— an animal infected
with a dangerous disease; the seizure “merely denied [the owners] the right to use their property
in an already prohibited manner”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1166 (1997).
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duplicated the results that common law nuisance litigation would
have reached.134 In 1980 the state adopted the Coastal Primary Sand
Dune Protection Act to prevent the despoliation of coastal primary
sand dunes and beaches. The Act included a model ordinance for
adoption by local governments. In the same year the city adopted
such an ordinance, regulating the use and development of coastal
dunes and requiring developers wishing to alter them to obtain a
permit from a state wetlands board.135 The plaintiffs purchased the
lots in question after adoption of the ordinance, and the state board
denied their application to develop. The issue was whether the denial
amounted to a taking. The plaintiffs claimed that it did because the
denial resulted in elimination of all economically viable use of the
lots.136
The court distinguished Lucas because in this case the plaintiffs
bought their land after adoption of the ordinance. “Therefore, the
‘bundle of rights’ which [the plaintiffs] acquired upon obtaining title
to the property did not include the right to develop the lots without
restrictions. . . . At best, any rights impaired by the Ordinance were
those of the property owner at the time the Ordinance came into
effect.”137 The plaintiffs argued that Lucas stood for the proposition
that the prohibited purpose under a regulatory restriction must have
always been unlawful, but the court disagreed. Because the ordinance
was effective before the plaintiffs acquired the property, the city did
not have to prove the existence of any nuisance or property law
preceding its adoption that would have prevented development. This
inquiry was “irrelevant and unnecessary” because the plaintiffs
acquired their property interest “already burdened by regulatory
restrictions. Thus, the city, by enacting the ordinance, took no
property rights from [the plaintiffs] since they cannot suffer a taking
of rights never possessed.”138 The court, therefore, found nothing
sacrosanct in the common law method for defining property rights in
land or in its methods for resolving conflicts between public and
134. 498 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1998).
135. Id. at 415.
136. Id. at 416.
137. Id. at 417 (footnote omitted).
138. Id. at 418.
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private resources.
The New York Court of Appeals has been particularly active in
quashing the notion that the only legal principles relevant to
ascertaining the scope of the nuisance exception are those ordained
by the common law. Its 1997 decision in Kim v. City of New York
illustrates this point, even though it was arguably a physical rather
than a regulatory takings case.139 The city regraded a public road and
placed side fill on a portion of plaintiffs’ property that abutted the
roadway to maintain lateral support. The plaintiffs acquired their
property with constructive notice that the property abutted a public
road below the legal grade. They nevertheless claimed a taking in the
form of a permanent physical invasion. The court held that due to
both the common law and the city charter obligation of lateral
support to a public roadway the plaintiffs’ title never included the
property interest they alleged was taken.140
The court began by stating that, regardless of whether it
characterized the alleged taking as physical or regulatory (a question
it found unnecessary to reach),141 “our analysis starts with a search
into the bundle of rights and concomitant obligations contained in
plaintiffs’ title.”142 The court rejected the contention that this
“logically antecedent inquiry” into the owner’s title should be
confined to an assessment of common law property and nuisance
rules, and should exclude statutory law. In particular, it refused to
interpret Lucas narrowly in order to dictate that result.143 Given the
theoretical basis of the inquiry (i.e., the bundle of rights that existed
at the time of acquisition),
we can discern no sound reason to isolate the inquiry to some
arbitrary earlier time in the evolution of the common law. It
would be an illogical and incomplete inquiry if courts were to
look exclusively to common-law principles to identify the
139. Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 809 (1997).
140. 681 N.E.2d at 314.
141. The case might have been characterized as a regulatory taking dispute because the
“plaintiffs’ real grievance [was] with the City’s regulation requiring the maintenance of lateral
support to the roadway.” The city placed the fill on the plaintiffs’ property only after they
refused to comply with their obligation under the Charter to do so. Id. at 315 n.2.
142. Id. at 315.
143. Id.
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preexisting rules of State property law, while ignoring
statutory law in force when the owner acquired title. To accept
this proposition would elevate common law over statutory law,
and would represent a departure from the established
understanding that statutory law may trump an inconsistent
principle of the common law.144
Quoting Munn v. Illinois,145 the court ruled flatly that:
[a] person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the
common law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law,
and is no more sacred than any other. . . . [T]he law itself . . .
may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the
legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations.
Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the
common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the
changes of time and circumstances.146
The law of the State originates in constitutional provisions,
statutes, and common law. To the extent that each source establishes
binding rules of property law, “each plays a role in defining the rights
and restrictions contained in a property owner’s title. Therefore, in
identifying the background rules of State property law that inhere in
an owner’s title, a court should look to the law in force, whatever its
source, when the owner acquired the property.”147 In Kim, the
applicable rules included the common law and the city charter. The
obligation to preserve and maintain the legal grade originated in
common law and was later set forth in the charter. The charter
provisions applied because the city raised the roadway up to the legal
grade before the plaintiffs acquired their property. The plaintiffs,
therefore, acquired their lot subject to the obligation in the charter to
raise it up to the legal grade, and the city met its burden of proving
that the plaintiffs never owned the property interest they claimed was
144. Id. (citations omitted).
145. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
146. Kim, 681 N.E.2d at 315 (quoting Munn, 94 U.S. at 134).
147. Id. at 315-16. The court cited Professor Mandelker’s article, Investment-Backed
Expectations, supra note 2, to support the position that preexisting statutory or regulatory
restrictions, as well as common law restrictions, are relevant to determining the scope of the
background rules of property. Id. at 316 n.3.
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taken.148
The Court of Appeals endorsed the same result in other cases as
well. In Anello v. Zoning Board. of Appeals, for example, the local
government adopted a steep-slope ordinance to protect
environmentally sensitive lands and promote the orderly development
of land with excessively steep slope areas.149 The plaintiff sought to
build a one-family home and applied for a variance from the
ordinance. The zoning board denied the variance, concluding that it
would have a substantial detrimental impact on the health, safety, and
welfare of the neighborhood. The plaintiff sued, claiming that denial
of the variance worked a taking. The court rejected the takings claim
because the plaintiff, who acquired the property two years after
adoption of the steep-slope ordinance, never acquired an unrestricted
right to build on the property free from the inhibitions originating
from the ordinance. The statutory restriction encumbered the owner’s
title from the outset of ownership.150 Likewise, in Gazza v. New York
State Department. of Environmental Conservation,151 a case
involving denial of a variance based on the anticipated adverse
impact of development on tidal wetlands, the court stated that in
applying the Lucas nuisance exception “[s]tate law may be examined
‘whatever its source.’ Thus, common-law principles and State
statutes may be examined to determine the limits and rights of a
landowner’s  . . . use . . ..”152
148. The “lateral-support obligation imposed on plaintiffs was a prevailing rule of the
State’s property law when they acquired their property and, accordingly, encumbered plaintiffs’
title and the constituent bundle of rights. The City’s enforcement of this legal obligation
therefore does not constitute a taking of any property interest owned by plaintiffs for which they
are entitled to compensation.” Id. at 319.
149. 678 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y.), cert. dismissed, 521 U.S. 1132 (1997).
150. 89 N.Y.2d 535, 539-40.
151. 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 813 (1997).
152. 679 N.E.2d at 1041 (citation omitted). The plaintiff in Gazza bought property in a
residential zoned district. The purchase price reflected the fact that a variance would be required
to build a residence on the property because it included tidal wetlands. The plaintiff applied to
the state environmental agency for two setback variances, but the agency denied the variances
due to the anticipated adverse impact on tidal wetlands. The plaintiff then sued, claiming that
the denial amounted to a taking. The threshold inquiry was whether a property interest even
existed to support a taking claim:
Since the enactment of the wetland regulations [before the plaintiff bought the
property], the only permissible uses for the subject property were dependent upon
those regulations which were a legitimate exercise of police power. Petitioner cannot
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Two other cases involving tideland and beach protection
regulatory schemes also support the position that all types of law, not
just common law, provide background principles relevant to the
“logically antecedent inquiry” into the nature of the regulated
property owner’s title at the time of acquisition of the regulated
interest. In Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a South
Carolina Supreme Court decision, the plaintiff bought ten acres in
1987 that included critical area tidelands defined by a state statute.153
Even though the statute barred dredging or filling these tidelands
without a permit, the plaintiff hired a contractor to haul fill material
into the area without first obtaining a permit. When a state agency
held the plaintiff in violation of the statute, he sued, alleging that the
agency’s order forbidding him from filling the area constituted a
compensable taking. The court held that no taking had occurred. The
plaintiff never had the right to fill the tidelands because at the time he
purchased the property a state statute forbade his doing so without a
permit.154 In Scott v. City of Del Mar, a California appellate court
decision, a city, relying on a beach overlay zone ordinance adopted to
protect public access to the shoreline, ordered the plaintiffs to remove
improvements to seawalls on their land because they amounted to
nuisances.155 The plaintiffs sued in inverse condemnation for the
property taken for public beach. The court held that the evidence
produced at the hearing on the removal orders proved that the
seawalls were abatable nuisances per se. The legislature had declared
that the obstruction of a public right-of-way was a nuisance, and the
zoning ordinance said that nonconforming structures constituted a
public nuisance abatable at the owner’s expense. Thus, no
compensation was due.156
base a taking claim upon an interest he never owned. The relevant property interests
owned by the petitioner are defined by those State laws enacted and in effect at the
time he took title and they are not dependent on the timing of State action pursuant to
such laws.
Id. at 1041.
153. 461 S.E.2d 388 (S.C. 1995).
154. Id. at 391.
155. 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 317 (1997).
156. Id. at 323. Other state cases also reflect a broad reading of the Lucas nuisance
exception to include pre-acquisition legislative measures. See, e.g., Hunziker v. Iowa, 519
N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994) (holding that property owner was not entitled to compensation, even
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2. Mandelker’s Take on the Nuisance Exception: Distinguishing
Reasonable v. Unreasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
This survey of post-Lucas case law demonstrates that a substantial
majority of the courts that have addressed the scope of the nuisance
exception recognized in Lucas have reached the same conclusion.
They have concluded that they should consider restrictions derived
from legislation and administrative regulation, as well as from
common law doctrines such as nuisance law, in order to ascertain
what use restrictions “inhere in the title”157 at the time of acquisition
by the property owner alleging a categorical taking based on denial of
all economically beneficial use.
This result, moreover, is defensible. Justice Scalia indicated in
Lucas that the answer to the “difficult question” of how to define the
regulated property interest for purposes of determining the extent of
the diminution in value caused by regulation:
may lie in how the owner’s reasonable expectations have  been
shaped by the State’s law of property— i.e., whether and to
what degree the State’s law has accorded legal recognition and
protection to the particular interest in land with respect to
which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or
elimination of) value.158
If the property owner’s reasonable expectations are relevant to (and
perhaps determinative of) the task of defining the regulated property
interest for purposes of calculating the extent of the diminution in
value, why should those expectations not also be relevant to the task
of defining the nature of the property interest affected by regulation
for purposes of determining whether the nuisance exception applies?
Justice Scalia hinted that they should be relevant, remarking that
though development of its land was not feasible, because state statute prohibiting disinterment
of land containing burial mounds predated the owner’s acquisition and the restrictions imposed
by the statute therefore inhered in the owner’s title), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1003 (1995);
Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 659 N.E.2d 1132 (Ind. Ct. App.) (holding that city’s entry onto
property to remove accumulated trash that had been declared a nuisance at a public hearing was
not a taking because building and safety code provisions authorized nuisance abatement
measures), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1028 (1996).
157. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
158. Id. at 1017 n.7.
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“newly legislated” limitations that deny all economically viable uses
give rise to a taking. The inference is that pre-existing (i.e., pre-
acquisition) limitations are part of the owner’s title to begin with and,
therefore, not subject to being taken; the owner simply has no
reasonable expectation of being able to engage in uses barred by pre-
existing limitations on title.
That is essentially the analysis endorsed by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in a 1999 decision, Good v. United States.159 A
developer asserted that the Corps of Engineers’ denial of a permit
under the CWA to fill wetlands in constructing a residential
development amounted to a taking. The court rejected the proposition
that a property owner alleging a categorical taking under Lucas need
not demonstrate interference with reasonable, investment-backed
expectations.160 It reasoned that the developer lacked a reasonable
expectation to be able to build a residential subdivision in the
wetlands due to “the regulatory climate that existed” when the
developer bought the property.161 At that time, the CWA already
required a permit from the Corps to dredge or fill wetlands adjacent
to navigable waters, and the Corps had considered environmental
factors in ruling on permit applications for years. In addition,
development required approval by the state and county. Accordingly,
the plaintiff “had both constructive and actual knowledge that either
state or federal regulations could ultimately prevent him from
building on the property.”162 Further, the owner did not apply for a
permit until 1980, after adoption of the Endangered Species Act. As a
result, the court held the developer lacked a reasonable, investment-
backed expectation that the developer would obtain the regulatory
approval necessary for development.163
159. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1554 (2000).
160. 189 F.3d at 1361.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1362.
163. Id. at 1363. See also Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“One who buys with knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic
loss.”) (quoting Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994)), cert. denied sub
nom. RCK Properties, Inc. v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 373 (1999). The cases seem to make the
time of acquisition, not the time the owner sought formal permission to develop, the relevant
time for assessing the reasonableness of the owner’s expectations. If the developer in Good had
acquired the property after the adoption of the Endangered Species Act, but had delayed
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More importantly for present celebratory purposes, the approach
most courts follow is precisely the one promoted by Dan Mandelker
in his work on the investment-backed expectations component of the
Penn Central balancing test applicable to cases not subject to Lucas’s
categorical rule. As Mandelker points out, the nuisance exception
enunciated by the Lucas majority suggests that a failure of
investment-backed expectations can avoid a taking even for
regulation that prohibits all economically viable use.164 Professor
Mandelker asserts that “[l]andowners have every right to expect
protection when government action takes away reserved property
rights or interferes with vested rights the government created.”165
They lack such an expectation, however, when they purchase their
interest with notice (including constructive notice) of pre-existing
regulatory programs or of government ownership of common
resources.166 In such cases, Professor Mandelker argues, the
landowners have assumed regulatory risk and do not deserve, as a
normative matter, compensation if that risk materializes in such a
way as to preclude desired uses.167 Indeed, Mandelker would deny the
right to compensation to landowners even in cases in which they
purchase with the knowledge that they might be regulated in the
future.168 Obviously, the case for denial of compensation is even
stronger if the landowner actually knew or should have known that a
regulatory restriction on title was already in place at the time of
acquisition.
applying for a permit until afterward, it would apparently be appropriate to judge the legitimacy
of its expectations against a pre-Endangered Species Act backdrop.
164. Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 2, at 224-25.
165. Id. at 238.
166. Id. at 244-45.
167. Id. at 227, 233-35. Cf. Tarlock, supra note 83, at 589 (“To the extent that a state,
either through legislation or judicial decisions, has identified harms that may result from the
unfettered use of property, the property owner’s reasonable expectation of compensation
diminishes.”).
168. Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 2, at 236.
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III. A SIMPLE TWIST OF FATE: JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF NEIGHBORS
FROM LEGISLATIVELY ENDORSED NUISANCES
A. Three Forms of Land Use Conflict Resolution
If land use and environmental regulation entails resolution of
potentially incompatible resource uses, then the government’s
decision about the appropriate degree of regulation necessarily favors
one use at the expense of another. Miller v. Schoene illustrates this
point.169 If the government chose to do nothing to address the risk
that red cedar rust would kill nearby apple trees its decision would
favor the owners of the cedar trees, who would escape having to take
action to suppress the risk. On the other hand, if the government
chose to take action to protect the apple trees, its decision would
impose restrictions on the cedar tree owners in order to achieve that
protection (in that case, the restrictions took the form of mandatory
destruction of the resource). By appearing to confine the nuisance
exception to background principles of common law, Lucas gave the
upper hand to the judiciary in determining when this kind of conflict
resolution would proceed at public as opposed to private expense.
The post-Lucas cases afford the legislature at least an equal say in
making that determination.170 Regardless of whether the land use
restriction is judicial or legislative in origin, as long as it takes effect
before the purchase of the property interest that has allegedly been
taken, the property owner is not entitled to payment for its inability to
engage in the restricted use.
Most of the cases in which takings claims are asserted involve
property owners such as developers who are engaged in what might
be called “active” externality-producing activities. A governmental
entity may resolve a potential conflict between a developer and its
neighbors in several ways. First, it may adopt a land use restriction
barring activity by a developer that would generate adverse impacts
for neighboring uses. The beneficiaries of such a measure would
include the owners of the neighboring properties that avoid exposure
to those impacts. I will call this a “first form” of resource use conflict
169. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
  170. See supra notes 108-56 and accompanying text.
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resolution. Second, the government may choose not to impose a land
use restriction on the developer (or it may waive application of an
existing land use restriction), thereby resolving the conflict in favor
of the developer by relegating adversely affected neighbors to
remedies available at common law, such as nuisance or negligence. I
will call this a “second form” of resource use conflict resolution.
Third, the government may go one step further and adopt legislation
that bars adversely affected neighbors from pursuing common law
remedies against harm-producing developmental activities. Perhaps
the most common example of this “third form” of resource use
conflict resolution is the “right-to-farm” statute, which immunizes
certain agricultural activities from common law tort actions.171
In the 1984 article The White River Junction Manifesto,
Mandelker and his co-authors noted that in judicial challenges by
neighbors to the second form of conflict resolution discussed above
“neighbors usually lose.”172 The Manifesto authors proceeded to
endorse reform that “strengthen[s] the legal position of neighbors.”173
It may be that relief to neighbors on the losing side of government
resolution of land use conflicts is increasing, though not necessarily
in the form that the Manifesto authors envisioned. Rather, relief may
be available to these neighbors in the context of the third form of land
use conflict resolution rather than the second. An important issue
raised by cases involving attacks by the neighbors on this third form
of land use conflict resolution is the degree to which the judiciary
will defer to the legislature’s chosen method of conflict resolution.
B. “Strengthening the Position of the Neighbors” in a Third Form
Land Use Conflict Resolution Case
The Supreme Court laid the blueprint for “strengthening the legal
position of [the] neighbors” in Richards v. Washington Terminal
171. See generally Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fisher, Protecting the Right to
Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1 WIS. L. REV. 95 (1983)
(discussing right to farm statutes and their relationship with other legal regimes, such as
environmental standards and municipal ordinances).
172. Williams et al., supra note 2, at 199.
173. Id. at 240-41.
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Co.174 A decision handed down the year after Richards, Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, involved a typical first form conflict resolution case, in
which the owner of a brickyard alleged that his conviction for
violating a city ordinance that barred him from continuing to operate
in his current location was invalid.175 The owner alleged that the
ordinance amounted to a taking because it rendered the operation
useless. The Court refused to vacate the conviction, concluding that
the ordinance represented a valid and noncompensable exercise of the
police power even though the brickyard’s appearance on the scene
preceded that of the neighbors whom the city sought to protect by
inducing the brickyard to shut down. Richards also resulted in
protection of the neighbors from an “active” harm generator, but the
Court afforded protection to neighbors in the rarer context of a third
form conflict resolution case.
The plaintiffs in Richards were the owners of properties exposed
to and damaged by dust, dirt, cinders, and gases emitted by trains
passing over railroad tracks adjacent to their land. The tracks were
located, constructed, and maintained under the authority of federal
legislation and implementing permits issued by the District of
Columbia local government.176 The Court agreed with the plaintiffs,
who argued they were entitled to compensation under the Fifth
Amendment for the damage they experienced as a result of the
railroad’s operation. The Court regarded the legislation that
authorized construction and operation of the tracks as legalizing those
activities so that they were not characterized as a public nuisance. At
the same time, “the acts done by defendant, if done without
legislative sanction, would form the subject of an action by plaintiff
to recover damages as for a private nuisance.”177 The Court
concluded that “the true rule” that governed the case recognized the
ability of legislatures to immunize what otherwise would be a public
nuisance, but it precluded such bodies from “confer[ring] immunity
from action for a private nuisance of such a character as to amount in
174. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
175. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
176. 233 U.S. at 550-51.
177. Id. at 551.
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effect to a taking of private property for public use.”178 The Fifth
Amendment barred Congress from forcing the plaintiffs to bear the
burden of the adverse effects of operation of the railroad without
compensation for the resulting harm.179
In the ensuing eighty-five years, both federal and state courts have
periodically cited Richards, particularly in aircraft overflight and
airport noise cases.180  The Iowa Supreme Court placed it back in the
limelight in Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, which relied heavily
on Richards by holding that a right-to-farm statute constituted a
taking of neighboring landowners’ property.181 A group of Iowa
farmers applied to the Kossuth County Board of Supervisors to
establish an “agricultural area” that would include their land. When
the Board approved the designation in 1995 neighboring property
owners sued the Board, alleging, among other things, that the
designation deprived them of property without due process and
amounted to a taking of their property under both the state and
federal constitutions.182 Under an Iowa statute the effect of the
designation was to immunize from nuisance suits those farmers
whose land was located in the designated agricultural area.183 The
neighbors asserted that the statutory immunity gave the farmers the
right to maintain a nuisance over their property, thereby creating an
easement over their lands and amounting to a per se taking.184
The first question the court addressed was whether the neighbors
had a constitutionally protected property right. The court held that
they did, relying on Iowa precedent establishing that the right to
maintain a nuisance is an easement.185 The immunity allowed the
178. Id. at 553.
179. Id. at 557.
180. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Argent v. United States, 124 F.3d
1277, 1283-84 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 583-84 (10th Cir. 1962).
Commentators also made note of the Richards case. See, e.g., Davis & Glicksman, supra note
32, at 395-96.
181. 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Girres v. Bormann, 119 S. Ct.
1096 (1999).
182. 584 N.W.2d at 312.
183. The statute provides that a farm located in a designated agricultural area “shall not be
found to be a nuisance regardless of the established date of operation or expansion of the
agricultural activities” of the farm. IOWA CODE § 352.11(1)(a) (1999).
184. See 584 N.W.2d at 313.
185. Id. at 315 (citing Churchill v. Burlington Water Co., 62 N.W. 646, 647 (1895)).
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farmers to engage in activities that would otherwise have amounted
to a nuisance.186 The court interpreted Richards, which it regarded as
factually analogous,187 as establishing that “the state cannot regulate
property so as to insulate the users from potential private nuisance
claims without providing just compensation to persons injured by the
nuisance.”188 The court analogized the effect of the immunity statute
to a “condemnation by nuisance,” a situation in which the
government incurs takings liability for its own operation of nuisance-
producing enterprises.189 Accordingly, the court declared the
immunity-vesting statute invalid because it amounted to a taking
under both the federal and state constitutions.190
Both Richards and Bormann amount to a constitutional judicial
overriding of the accommodation of conflicting uses reached by the
Congress of the United States in one case and by the state legislature
of Iowa in the other. The Bormann court acknowledged its obligation
to adopt a deferential posture to the state legislature, the branch of
government responsible for “reach[ing] consensus in highly
controversial public decisions. Those decisions demand our sincere
respect.”191 However, in this case the statute amounted to “a
commandeering of valuable property rights without compensating the
owners, and sacrificing those rights for the economic advantage of a
few. In short, it appropriates valuable private property interests and
awards them to strangers.”192 In such circumstances, the courts are
obliged to vitiate the politically based decisions of the legislature.193
The conclusion that legislative usurpation of a previously
available tort cause of action constitutes a taking is consistent with
the view that a cause of action is an intangible property interest
186. 584 N.W.2d at 316.
187. Id. at 319.
188. Id. at 319-20. The court cited Pennsylvania R.R. v. Angel, 41 N.J. Eq. 316, 7 A. 432
(1886), as a case supportive of the same proposition.
189. 584 N.W.2d at 320-21. Cf. Sax, supra note 90, at 36 (arguing that the government
should have to compensate when it imposes harm in the course of acting in an entrepreneurial
capacity).
190. 584 N.W.2d at 321. The neighbors sought no compensation. The court remanded for
issuance of an order declaring the Iowa statute unconstitutional and void. Id. at 321-22.
191. Id. at 322.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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protected by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. This theory applies
even in circumstances where the cause of action is not designed to
protect a person’s interest in the possession, use, or enjoyment of
land.194 But is the judicial invalidation of the particular means of land
use conflict resolution approved by the legislatures in Richards and
Bormann consistent with the thrust of the post-Lucas cases
interpreting the nuisance exception? The courts in most of those cases
have concluded that when they define the property interest allegedly
taken they must abide by legislative accommodations of conflicting
land uses by taking into account statutory restrictions on land use.195
The key to reconciling the first form and the third form of land use
conflict resolution cases may lie again with the concept of legitimate
investment-backed expectations. Neither the Richards nor Bormann
court indicated whether the plaintiffs making the takings claims
purchased their properties before or after the adoption of the statutes
that legally foisted upon them the externalities produced by the
railroad and farming activities. If the neighbors purchased their
properties before the statutes were adopted, then they had a legitimate
expectation that they could pursue a private nuisance cause of action
against any activity that unreasonably interfered with the ability to
use and enjoy their properties, including a dust-spewing railroad or
an odor-producing farm. Interference with these expectations through
legislative elimination of the cause of action may thus require
compensation.196 If the neighbors purchased their lands after adoption
194. See, e.g., Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988);
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (interpreting Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), as “affirmatively settl[ing] . . . that a cause of
action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”).
Cf. Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and
State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 305 (1988) (“A party who can establish the
elements of a cause of action has a property interest in using a state’s adjudicatory mechanism
to vindicate the rights protected by the substantive law.”).
  195. See supra part II.B.
196. See Beermann, supra note 194, at 302 (stating that “the holder of a cause of action has
a legitimate expectation that the claim will be recognized by state law”). As previously
indicated, supra note 183, the Iowa right-to-farm statute provided that a farm located in a
designated agricultural area was immune from nuisance liability “regardless of the established
date of operation” of the farming activities. Iowa Code § 352.11(1)(a) (1999). In this situation
the neighbors are thus stripped of their tort cause of action against externality-generating farms
even if they acquired their properties before the farms began operating.
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of the relevant statutes, they would have had no legitimate
expectation of being able to seek relief against the activity in tort
because they would have been on notice of the unavailability of a
cause of action against the offensive activity, and presumably would
have paid a reduced price for land burdened by the resulting
easement. The situation is thus the same as the one facing neighbors
in a first form land use conflict resolution case. If the landowner
acquired the property interest before adoption of the land use statutes,
then the landowner’s legitimate expectations are defined without
reference to those statutes. If, however, the landowner acquired the
property interest after the statutory enactment, the landowner takes
title subject to the statute; the restrictive measures inhere in the title.
In this situation the landowner is on notice of the restriction,
presumably paying less than the cost of similar land without
constraints, and having no reasonable expectation of using the land
free of the restrictions. Enforcement of the pre-acquisition
restrictions, therefore, does not amount to a taking, regardless of its
economic impact on the regulated property.
IV. CONCLUSION
The task of defining the boundary line between permissible,
noncompensable police power regulation and a compensable,
regulatory taking may be no more “intractable” today than it was
before Lucas.197 Per se rules are supposedly easier to implement than
legal approaches based on multi-factor balancing tests,198 and the
Supreme Court in Lucas invented (or confirmed, depending upon
one’s interpretation of preexisting Supreme Court precedents in the
area) a per se rule for regulations that eliminate all economically
beneficial use of the regulated property. At the same time the Court
enunciated an exception to this categorical rule. Under the nuisance
exception, a restriction on the use of property does not trigger
197. Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 2, at 249.
198. For an analysis of the relationship between the degree of complexity of legal rules and
the administrative costs for their implementation, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). But cf. Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the
Governed: Against Simple Rules for A Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 989 (1997)
(arguing that “[t]here are no simple rules for this complex world”).
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liability under the takings clause, despite causing a total wipeout of
economic value, if the restriction inhered in the regulated property
owner’s title under relevant background principles of property law.
The tandem of the Lucas categorical rule and its exception may
have provided structure to the analytical inquiries attendant upon
deciding whether a regulation with a dramatic economic impact
amounts to a compensable taking. However, it clearly has not
answered, or even addressed, all of the relevant questions. For
example, how is a court supposed to define the “property interest”
affected by the regulation in order to determine whether a deprivation
of all economically viable use has occurred? How is a court supposed
to ascertain whether economically viable use remains? What kinds of
restrictions inhere in the pre-regulation title such that the property
owner’s inability to engage in them provides no basis for a per se
taking claim?
Shortly after the Lucas decision, Professor Mandelker predicted
that this last question would become the focus of controversy and
debate, and he was right. He took issue with the Supreme Court’s
apparent intention to limit the relevant background principles to those
reflected in the state’s common law, arguing that such a limitation
displayed an unseemly judicial disregard for the authority of the
legislature to accommodate conflicts in land use. The courts, with
some exceptions, seem to be endorsing this criticism and responding
to it by expanding the scope of the nuisance exception to include pre-
acquisition legislative and regulatory restrictions. Mandelker also
emphasized the importance of focusing on the legitimacy of the
regulated property owner’s investment-backed expectations. Indeed,
that factor has played a key role in the judicial efforts to work out the
parameters of the Lucas categorical rule and accompanying
exception. Finally, Mandelker urged enhanced measures to protect
the efforts of those whose lands adjoin active externality-generating
activities. The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Bormann provides
just such protection.
One important question remains: is there anything else that
Mandelker has been telling us about the law of regulatory takings to
which we may not yet have paid sufficient attention? If the foregoing
analysis serves no other function, it at least counsels strongly in favor
of the most careful perusal of anything Mandelker has to say about
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takings law. Who knows how many more predictions and
prescriptions Professor Mandelker has already made and is yet to
make concerning the law of regulatory takings law that the opinions
in future takings cases will ultimately bear out?
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